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Abstract
It is said that the Constitutions of the nineteenth century Colombia were battle 
cards that appeased the military confrontation, but at the same time they contained 
the seed for the next confrontation. The 1991 Constitution breaks with that 
tradition, as it is not perceived as a battle card, but as a peace pact. Through a 
comparative politics methodology, this article contrasts the constitutional process 
of 1991 with other scenarios of deep institutional reconstruction to argue that what 
makes the 1991 Constitution different from those battle cards was the type of crisis 
that led to the constitution of the National Constituent Assembly, its origin in a 
popular movement committed to a communicative action and, lastly, its inclusive 
and deliberative character, in which groups traditionally marginalized were heard.
Keywords: 1991Constitution; National Constituent Assembly of 1991; constitutional 
processes: constitutional history.
Resumen
Se dice que las Constituciones de la Colombia del Siglo XIX eran cartas de batalla 
que aplacaban la confrontación militar, pero al mismo tiempo contenían la semilla 
para el siguiente enfrentamiento. La Constitución de 1991 rompe con esa tradición, 
en tanto esta no es percibida como una carta de batalla, sino como un pacto de 
paz. A través de una metodología de política comparada, este artículo contrasta el 
proceso constitucional de 1991 con otros escenarios de profunda reconstrucción 
institucional para argüir que lo que hace que la Constitución de 1991 sea diferente a 
aquellas cartas de batalla fue el tipo de crisis que llevó a la constitución de la Asamblea 
Nacional Constituyente, su origen en un movimiento popular comprometido con 
una acción comunicativa y, por último, su carácter inclusivo y deliberativo, en el que 
se escuchó a grupos tradicionalmente marginados.
Palabras Clave: Constitución de 1991, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1991, 
procesos constitucionales, historia constitucional.
Resumo
Diz-se que as Constituições da Colômbia do século XIX eram cartas de batalha que 
aplacavam o enfrentamento militar, mas ao mesmo tempo continham a semente 
para o próximo confronto. A Constituição de 1991 rompe com essa tradição, pois 
não é considerada uma carta de batalha, mas como um pacto de paz. Através de uma 
metodologia de política comparada, este artigo contrasta o processo constitucional 
1991 com outros cenários de profunda reconstrução institucional para arguir que o 
que fez a Constituição de 1991 ser diferente a aquelas carta de batalha foi o tipo de 
crise que levou a constituição da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, sua origem em 
um movimento popular comprometido com uma ação comunicativa e, por último, 
seu caráter inclusivo e deliberativo, em que se ouviu grupos tradicionalmente 
marginalizados. 
Palavras-chave: Constituição de 1991, Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1991, 
processos constitucionais, história constitucional.
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Introduction
“The 1886 Constitution was the consecration of the philosophy of the 
winning party: it was centralizing, authoritarian, and autocratic. The 
new constitution is a peace pact.” 
- Colombian Constitutional Court judge 
It is said that in the blood soaked 19th century in the place that were to become 
the Republic of Colombia, factions dispersed over the gritty territory fought 
each other always with a constitutional project in their backpack. In the end 
of each of the seven national civil wars the winning party imposed its vision 
of political (and social life) on the losing one (Deas, 1997). These battle cards 
then appeased a civil war, but at the same time contained in them the seed 
for the next round of upheaval and bloodshed (Valencia Villa, 2012). The 
Constitution from 1991 breaks with that tradition. The common sentiment is 
that contrary to the battle cards of the 19th century, the 1991 Constitution is a 
peace pact. This paper is not going to engage in a constitutional comparison 
between the various documents organizing political life in Colombia. I am 
interested in what is it precisely that makes the 1991 Constitution different. 
For that end, I engage in comparative politics methodology, and contrast the 
1991 Constitution with other instances of profound institution building. I argue 
that the 1991 constituent process differs because 1) of the unique crisis that 
led to the constituent assembly, which resulted from a normative cleavage 
between the normative claim of a democracy to uphold basic human rights 
and channels for political participation, and the political reality of a country 
besieged by drug violence; 2) its origin in a popular movement engaging in 
communicative action; 3) its deliberative and inclusive procedures, which 
incorporated previously marginalized groups and public input. The result –a 
progressive and rights expanding document with novel mechanisms to enforce 
rights protection– is therefore not a coincidence, but on the contrary it is related 
to the original crisis, its communicative genesis, and the inclusion of previously 
excluded groups during deliberation.1 
1  This paper is rooted in my dissertation, which built on expansive elite interviews in Colombia, 
jurisprudential analyses of Constitutional Court cases, content analyses of newspaper and magazine 
discourses, and detailed secondary literature surveys. See appendix 1 for a full overview of the 
methodology and interview data.
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The Critical Juncture Framework
The social sciences have a fascination with change: what causes change, what 
initiates it, and what arrests change? Modern political science has come to 
understand the absence of change as a function of the role institutions play in 
basic interactions. They structure expectations, determine the rules of the game, 
and exclude certain options from patterns of behavior. In short, institutions’ 
defining feature is their persistence over time. Yet, persistence over time is only 
intelligible if it contrasts with moments or periods of change. If institutions 
are structured and stable expectations, then these expectations or rules of the 
game must have been put into place at some point. In other words, there must 
be an origin to the stability that institutions instill that “precedes the question 
of institutional legacies” (Negretto, 2014, p.3). 
Such moments are profoundly political ones, during which actors engage 
with each other with the intention to structure future interaction according to 
their own interests. To better understand these processes, the Colliers’ critical 
juncture framework from their seminal study on what shaped political arenas 
in Latin America is an essential analytical tool. It helps us to identify not only 
the peculiarity of specific moments in history, but their relationship to past and 
present. After all, institutions – even new ones – are never created ex-nihilo, 
but retain traces of the past (Negretto, 2014). 
The Colliers understand critical junctures as “periods of significant change 
which typically occur in distinct ways in different countries or in other units 
of analysis” and result in long(er) lasting, distinct legacies (2002, p. 29). 
These are contingent historical events that did not simply occur randomly, 
but arose from particular historical crises and had long-lasting consequences, 
because agents chose one path over another. Periods, or moments, of profound 
social change such as revolutionary change, cyclical interactions, or political 
incorporation, were preceded by social and cultural cleavages (Rokkan & 
Lipset, 1967; Collier & Collier, 2002). Such cleavages create tensions and 
crises that cannot be contained with existing political mechanisms of conflict 
resolution and require a reconfiguration of the rules governing socio-political 
interaction. There are three defining components that characterize a critical 
juncture: preceding conditions, the moment of crisis, and the legacies left by 
the decisions taken during the critical juncture. Antecedent conditions can 
already contain the cleavages from which change evolves, but remain stable 
until the equilibrium is ruptured (by external forces) and space for fundamental 
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alterations open up. Such junctures become critical, if the eventual choices and 
its consequences could not be predicted by existing patterns of behavior, but 
reflect the presence of new actors, interacting under specific constraints, giving 
rise to new institutional frameworks that structure (more predictably) future 
interaction (see Mahoney, 2000, p. 514). In the end, the Collier and Collier 
model looks like this:
Figure 1
The critical juncture framework
Source: Collier & Collier, 2002, p. 30. 
Critical junctures are said to appear in more than one unit of analysis, which 
usually requires cross-sectional data. Here, I want to utilize the framework to 
turn inwards within the Colombian case. This helps me to utilize case study 
strength, namely that phenomena have prima facie causal relationships, while 
it also mitigates the weakness of lacking cross-sectional data. I contrast three 
institutional reform processes – the Reyes Reforms (1905-10), the National 
Front Agreement (53-57), and the 1991 constituent process – that shared the 
basic ideal type trajectory: 
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There is a legal distinction between the Reyes Reforms, the National Front 
Agreement, and the 1991 constituent process in that the latter disrupted the 
validity of the existing charter, while the two former instances preserved the 
legality of the existing constitution. As Negretto explains, however, constitutional 
replacements and amendments “modify the constitution by introducing textual 
changes, and these formal alterations are sometimes comparable in scope and 
importance” (2014, p.19). This was indeed the case for these three sub-cases: 
in each instance, electoral, legislative, executive, and judicial institutions were 
altered. In addition, even the amendment processes had plebiscitary components 
and were submitted to popular confirmation in referenda or held in a (flawed) 
constituent assembly. Yet, the outcome in the 1991 Constitution differed on 
most of these parameters. 
From Political Crisis to Consociational Agreement
Turning to the first two cases, it becomes readily apparent that during the 
Reyes Reforms and the National Front process, reformers responded to crises 
that, having evolved from within the political elite, were not rooted in deep 
social or cultural cleavages.. Essentially, elites were unable to compromise 
and strike deals that satisfied the entire range of either party’s membership and 
leadership. The resulting partisan clashes signaled that the original political 
arrangement was insufficient to contain conflicts of interest and identity, 
and forced elites to hammer out new deals. These elite-driven processes of 
institutional reform established new consociational (bi-partisan) arrangements, 
giving each party significant influence in regard to the path future politics were 
to take, while protecting forms of cronyism by placing them on a more stable 
formal institutional setting. In the end control over the political process was not 
relinquished to popular participation demands. The political system remained 
oligarchic, and contained in it the seed for future upheaval.
The Thousand-Day war, Colombia’s most violent conflict in the 19th century, 
preceded the Reyes Reforms, and, in the words of Safford & Palacios, “confirmed 
the saying that war is the continuation of politics by other means” (2002, 
p.249-250), because factions in each party produced dynamics that moved 
the country irreversibly down the road to war. More specifically, Mazzuca & 
Robinson found that the beginning of the violent clashes can be traced to a 
dysfunctional political framework that permanently excluded Liberals from 
power and representation, and aggravated the economic crisis by using public 
75
JAN BOESTEN
ISSN 1657-6535
funds for the suppression of contest from the opposition, rather than assuaging 
its effects and allocate funds for productive investments. “Economic turmoil 
was” therefore “an indication of the impact of political conflict on the growing 
fiscal crisis and the associated monetary expansion of the 1890s” (2009, p.307). 
In other words, socio-economic tensions were compounded to crisis proportion 
by the failure of political institutions to coordinate between factions and utilize 
public funds to counter-cyclically soften the effects of fluctuating world prices 
in key export commodities.
During the 1890s, both parties split into more and less radical factions. 
On the conservative side, Nationalists and Historical Conservatives disagreed 
on the rigidity of centralization and importance of foreign trade, while the 
liberals divided into two factions around the old Radical oligarchy (more 
radical in name only), and a younger, more bellicose faction called the Nuevos. 
Nationalists and Nuevos vehemently opposed each other, while Historical 
Conservatives and the Radical oligarchy of the Liberal Party were more peace 
oriented due to their shared commitment to foreign trade (Safford & Palacios, 
2002, p.250). The institutional framework further aggravated the political 
situation by strengthening the more radical faction on each side. Conservative 
Presidents of the Regeneración (a movement of conservative politicians 
that sought to centralize rule in Colombia) implemented the appointment of 
Governors as a recentralization mechanism (hallowing Liberal influence at the 
regional level), and utilized extra-ordinary powers to unilaterally ban political 
activities “‘offensive to public order’” (Mazzuca & Robinson 2009, p.293). 
When Liberal appeals for more inclusion were ignored by the National faction 
of the Conservative Party, which dominated the Senate, the younger Liberals 
rebelled in October 1899, setting in motion a well known escalation pattern: 
the central government endowed civil and military authorities with the power 
to decree loans to governors, who used that power to force affluent Liberals to 
contribute with funds. This reinforced party identity and “divided Colombian 
along party lines more than along those of socio-economic classes” (Safford 
& Palacios, p.250). For the next three years, Colombians fought each other 
along those party lines, which produced the bloodiest internal conflict Latin 
America had seen yet. 
The years prior to the period that Colombians simply refer to as La Violencia 
(the Violence) were marked by socio-economic tensions that surfaced with 
the mobilization of the working class. It is important to take into account that 
76
COLOMBIA’S CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE COMMUNICATIVE ORIGIN OF THE 1991 CONSTITUTION
PRECEDENTE 2016 VOL. 8 / ENERO-JUNIO, 67-96. CALI – COLOMBIA
political institutions were not only inept to incorporate lower class demands, 
but contributed to the radicalizing dynamic by again pushing party factions 
towards conflict with one another. Incorporation of the working class received 
a catalyst through the election of the Liberals in 1929, which in turn resulted 
from the shift to proportional representation. It opened the path to Colombia’s 
New Deal Period known as Revolución en marcha (Revolution on the March) 
under President Alfonso López Pumarejo. The Colliers detail three interrelated 
factors underlying the fact that incorporation of labor by the Liberal Party failed: 
1) it was a cross-sectional party with roots in the 19th century; 2) it was not 
founded for the purpose of working-class representation by workers themselves; 
3) incorporation of labor came “early in relation to the development of the 
Colombian labor movement” (2002, p.271). These three factors split the attitude 
of the Liberals towards social reforms: the radical wing around labor lawyer 
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán wanted further social reforms, while the more moderate 
wing, backed by the landowning oligarchy amongst the Liberal ranks, already 
considered the López reforms as too extreme. 
At the end of the 1930s and the early 1940s, the divide inside the Liberal 
Party provided the Conservatives with an opening to regain power. While 
Gaitán was capable of coalescing wide public support behind his leadership, 
the moderate wing moved towards the Conservative Party. The Conservative 
Party which had not run candidates since the 1934 elections returned to the polls 
motivated by the Liberal split. Moreover, goaded by the populism of the Gaitán 
wing, former President López moved to support the moderate Conservative 
candidate Ospina, who was elected to the presidency in 1946. The proclaimed 
unity government between moderate Conservatives and Liberals could not 
prevent the Gaitán wing from controlling the Liberal faction in Congress, 
which announced him as their candidate for the 1950 presidential elections. 
As the Liberal split deepened, Conservatives began to violently retake control 
of the state at the regional level, transforming the intra-party conflict into an 
inter-party collusion. As a consequence, the coalition between moderates on 
both sides of the aisle collapsed, and after Gaitán’s assassination in April 1948, 
civic order broke down entirely: first in Bogotá and then in the entire country. 
In November 1949 the Conservative Gómez was unopposedly elected president 
and “with the exclusion of Liberals from all areas of government, both national 
and regional, the institutional breakdown was complete” (Collier & Collier, 
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2002, p.312). As in 1899, elite politics as conversation among gentlemen failed, 
resulting in a drastic escalation of violent conflict.
There are striking similarities between both reform processes, beginning 
with the role the military played in orchestrating talks between factions – taking 
on a more or less neutral role –, and the coordination back to civilian control. 
The government of General Rafael Reyes was in power from 1904 until 1909, 
and General Rojas Pinilla from 1953 until 1957. General Reyes had built up 
his prestige in the civil wars of the late 19th century and was nominated for 
the presidency by the Conservative Party. Rojas Pinilla was “essentially thrust 
into power in the midst of La Violencia by a segment of the Conservative Party 
and elements of the military” (Hartlyn, 1988, p. 48). The end of both their 
respective incumbencies in power, too, bore interesting similarities: they slightly 
overstayed the welcome bestowed upon them, but power was returned to civilian 
rule without the use of violence or widespread civic activism. General Rafael 
Reyes was dislodged by a coalition of partisans from both parties in 1909, and 
General Rojas lost appeal amongst fellow generals, who orchestrated the return 
to civilian control (Solaún, 1980, p.3; Esguerra Portocarrero, 2012, p.84). 
Corresponding to the elite instigation of the processes, institutional 
engineering during each juncture was decisively elite-controlled and lacking of 
civic participation. The bi-partisan movement to depose Reyes in 1909, known 
as the Partido Republicano, instituted a constituent assembly to overcome the 
partisan and factionalist tensions that had fuelled internal conflicts and civil 
wars. Crucially, it received its support from merchants and industrialists and not 
a movement; as Hartlyn asserts, it largely “foreshadowed the National Front” 
(1988, p.27). The National Front agreement was negotiated in Spanish cities 
between 1956 and 1957, and only post-factum ratified in a plebiscite. 
The absence of the popular classes and civil society in the negotiations, while 
(traditional) party elites played central roles in either instance of institutional 
reconfigurations, best explains why both outcomes essentially evolved around 
securing the representation of each party in the most important national 
institutions (with the National Front going further than the 1910 reforms). 
General Reyes had already embraced a form of minority representation in 
the armed forces, encouraging Liberal families to send their children to the 
armed forces (Bushnell, 1993, p.156). The national assembly incorporated the 
principle of minority representation for the electoral system and replaced the 
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majority vote of the legislature with the incomplete vote, thereby assuaging the 
antagonizing effects of the old electoral regime. This guaranteed the Liberals 
a greater share of representation in Congress, while Conservatives retained 
control of the executive until 1930.
The National Front agreement essentially split political power between both 
parties. Previously elected offices were depoliticized and alternatively handed 
to partisans from each party. Congressional elections, too, were depoliticized 
and neither party was allowed to attain a majority in either of the two chambers. 
Parties in Congress would then agree on a candidate to be elected as President, 
alternating between each party. Finally, equal share of representation was 
extended to most public offices safe for the military. In the civil service, 
restrictions on political activities of government officials were imposed as well 
as prohibitions against political discriminations in hiring practices (Hartlyn, 
1988 & 1989).
The Reyes Reforms and the National Front agreement overhauled judicial 
institutions and increased the formal institutional independence of Colombia’s 
highest court; thereby also reflecting the logic of providing mutual guarantees. 
While the 1886 Constitution created the Supreme Court, it did not place a lot 
of value on the question of the constitutionality of laws, and heavily involved 
both, the executive and the legislature, in investigating claims of such nature. 
The 1910 reforms entrust the Supreme Court with the quintessential citizens’ 
right of testing the constitutionality of laws. The aptly called acción popular de 
inconstitucionalidad (popular action of unconstitutionality) anticipated Hans 
Kelsen’s introduction of a similar acción in the Austrian Constitution after the 
conclusion of World War I, which marked the beginning of constitutional control 
by an independent court in Europe (Esguerra Portocarrero, 2012, p.107; see also 
Cepeda Espinosa, 2007, p.17; Mendieta González, 2010, p.72). The National 
Front implemented the cooptación method for selecting vacant positions on 
the Court, fully depoliticizing the selection process by giving judges on the 
courts the task to choose replacements (García Villegas, 2001). All of these 
institutional novelties carry in them the logic of political insurance mechanisms 
in times of uncertainty (Finkel, 2008; Hartlyn, 1988). Above all, substantive 
claims to justice and human dignity, consecrated in unalienable rights, were 
conspicuously missing from either accord.
Significant about both accords is that they succeeded in stabilizing political 
relations between both parties, and thereby provided a suitable context for 
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economic development, but never provided responsive political structures 
capable of incorporating unforeseeable shifts in context and the full range of 
political expressions. Above all, they lacked proper mechanisms to address 
socio-economic inequalities and uneven access to power. By depoliticizing and 
demobilizing society, the National Front agreement left “the way open for the 
potential emergence of competing, anti-regime forces” (Collier & Collier, p.667; 
Hartlyn, 1988, p.84 & p.156). In the 1980s, the effects of the international drug 
trade further compounded these internal contradictions, creating the situation 
that resulted in the 1991 Constitution.
1991: Constructing Institutions through Communicative Action
Contrary to the first two cases, the 1991 constitution was and is a rights-based 
constitution. The effects of the international drug trade, an external shock, 
further compounded the internal contradictions of the Colombia’s consociational 
regime, creating what I call a normative cleavage between the normative 
claim of a democracy and the political reality of a state besieged by violence. 
Institutional engineering has its origin in a popular, student movement that 
called for a general overhaul of the political regime. The constituent assembly 
was public, included citizen input, and incorporated previously marginalized 
groups, resulting in a new constitution that embraced human dignity and rights 
as organizational imperatives of the constitutional order.
When Colombia became the centre of the international cocaine trade, the 
country’s criminalization served as an external catalyst to a regime crisis that 
was bubbling beneath the apparently stable two-party, pacted democracy. It 
unleashed centrifugal forces, that the State was not able to sudbue, within the 
two-party-system. New, powerful armed actors co-operated with regional party 
elites, eliminated peasants, unionists, and other left-wing activists who yearned 
for more inclusion and participation. Party bosses in the country’s center were 
either complicit in the crimes of regional elites (such as many cadres from the 
Liberal Party), or became victims of the violence themselves (such as Luis 
Carlos Galán). Above all, it became evident that the regime could not reform 
itself from within. During the 1970 and 1980s, progressive wing leaning 
political leaders attempted to renew the political system from within, yet failed 
either in Congress or in the Sala Constitucional (constitutional plenum) of the 
Supreme Court. The result was a profound cleavage between the normative 
claim of a democratic regime and the political reality of a regime incapable of 
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upholding basic human rights and keeping open even minimum channels of 
political participation. 
Spontaneous, civic activism sprung up as a consequence of Liberal candidate 
Luis Carlos Galán’s assassination in 1989. It prompted 20,000 students to take 
to the street in a silent march and call for an all-encompassing institutional 
reform. They argued that the violence and ubiquitous terror were symptoms of a 
much deeper political crisis, rooted in the exclusive and restrictive nature of the 
National Front regime, joined forces with a broad student alliance, and called 
for a (symbolic) national plebiscite held alongside the presidential elections 
in 1990 (Dugas, 2001). After the plebiscite to implement a constituent body, 
president elect César Gaviria moved to implement elections for a constituent 
assembly, somewhat dominating the process again. However, the essential 
student demands became the central pillars of debate in the constituent assembly, 
and crucial links between civic society and representatives in the constituents 
assembly did not disappear. Above all, traditional parties did not dominate the 
constituent assembly and failed to mobilize their cronies (Echeverri Urubura, 
2012, p.458). While Congressional elections that year gave 94 percent of the 
vote share to traditional parties, now only 45 of the 70 delegates came from 
the two traditional parties (70 percent); and, most notably, 19 came from the 
demobilized M-19 guerrilla (see Figure 2). 
Not only the election to the assembly and its results were peculiar, but 
the drafting stage preceding the assembly differed from other instances of 
institutional engineering as well. Citizens could give input in workshops held 
prior to the election (in more than 1,500 locations in the entire country) and 
produced 350,000 projects of considerations that had to be considered in debates 
within the assembly. Finally, debates were held in public and not behind closed 
doors amongst gentlemen.
The new constitution became a neo-constitutionalist charter that is centered 
on the protection of human dignity and thereby echoes the grievance that led 
students to protest on the streets in the first place. The Constitution’s norms 
created an entirely novel institutional structure embedded in a strong normative 
framework, which, for the first time in Colombia’s history, included a vast 
array of rights at the rank of constitutional norms. Even the most ardent 
critics of historical constitutionalism in Colombia noted that the emerging 
Constitution is reflective of the democratic moment at its origin, not adhering 
to a coherent worldview and normative ideology imposed by the victor, but 
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rather a document of compromise and reconciliation that embraces liberal, 
conservative, nationalistic, internationalistic, and, above all, social democratic 
ideas (Valencia Villa, 2012, p.205-212). The new constitution introduced 
important changes to the legislative and executive branch – such as the lack 
of parliamentary immunity for the former legislature and the curtailment of 
emergency powers for the latter – but the most important changes certainly 
befell the judiciary. It created new courts (the High Council of the Judiciary, the 
Constitutional Court), a new attorney general office inside the judiciary (Fiscalía 
General), and new mechanisms (Tutela) to enforce rights. The Constitutional 
Court became the final instance of abstract review of constitutionality of laws 
and the review of concrete rights.
The effect of the new constitution is best seen in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court and the shift away from a legalistic judicial culture to 
a more neo-constitutionalist one; from the Old Law (Viejo Derecho) of the 
1886 Constitution to the New Law (Nuevo Derecho) of the 1991 Constitution2. 
2  This section builds entirely on the interviews conducted in Bogotá from September 2012 until 
May 2013. For a quick overview of interview results, see Appendix C.
Figure 2
Composition of Constituent Assembly 1991
Source: Uprimny, 2003, p. 53.
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Historical constitutionalism in Colombia evolved out of the political thought of 
the two most important figures of the independence wars, Simón Bolívar and 
Francisco de Paula Santander. They were ardent readers of the French tradition 
of constitutional thought, with its focus on administrative law and the structural 
organization of the State. It is consequently not surprising that under Old Law, 
the judge’s role in interpreting the law was akin to Montesquieu’s vision of the 
judge as the mouth of the law. This has three interdependent consequences: 1) 
the most important principle by which judges interpreted the constitutionality of 
laws was the principle of legality; 2) precedence, if any, has only an extremely 
minute role in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court; 3) rights are subsumed 
under the civil code and have no constitutional standing on their own. The 
principle of legality holds that “public forces are only allowed to what the 
law allows them to do”3. If public officials are only limited by the written 
text, the interpretation of constitutional texts becomes a positivist and textual 
exercise, giving supreme authority to the written word of the constitution and 
law. A direct result of the centrality of the principle of legality in Old Law is 
its most important legacy: a strict formalism in legal questions. Formalism in 
constitutional interpretation means that legal arguments evolve around questions 
of procedure and competence and not about substantive contentions. 
The “clinging to forms”, adherence to order, and subjection of rights to 
legality in Colombia’s historical constitutionalism reflect the generic ambiguity 
in Colombia’s history, and its oscillation between legality and illegality, 
democracy and cronyism, peace and violence. Colombia’s legalism was for 
the most part situated at the discursive level, which means that valid public 
arguments had to emulate legal vocabulary, even if actors were motivated 
by strategic interest4. This focus on legal forms and vocabulary fuelled a 
high confidence in the transformative capacity of law, but at the same time 
created a veil of ignorance for real socio-political grievances. It was, so to 
speak, an exercise in “changing everything, so nothing changes.” Students in 
the movement to reform the Constitution not only lamented the corruption of 
Congress, but also the immobility of the Constitution itself. In the student’s 
stance both corruption and immobilization of the Constitution were at the root 
3  Interview, subject no. 5 (auxiliary judge), May 15, 2013.
4  Interview subject no. 35 (professor of law), May 7, 2013. 
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of what had caused Colombia’s intractable position at the end of that decade, 
and such a situation required change5.
The novelty of the 1991 Constitution becomes readily apparent in the first 
Article. While the 1886 Constitution proclaimed a unitary character that arises 
out of the sovereignty of the nation (Article 1 and 2), without stipulating what 
this nation consists of, the 1991 Constitution mainly defined Colombia as a 
social State of Law that rests in the human dignity of its pluralistic society, 
whose members come together to work in solidarity in order to attain the general 
good (Article 1). This characterization of the Colombian nation – which just 
as well could have been a characterization of the constituent assembly from 
1991 – reappears in some of the most important decisions the Constitutional 
Court has issued. In its 2010 decision, declining the constitutionality of a reform 
extending presidential terms, the Court argued:
The notion of people that accompanies the conception of constitutional 
liberal democracy cannot ignore the notion of pluralism, which involves 
the coexistence of different ideas, races, genders, backgrounds, religions, 
institutions or social groups. Such a heterogeneous people accepts that all 
power must have limits and therefore agrees, as a sovereign people, and 
in accordance with the democratic model, to become self-restraint and 
establishes channels through which to express all its diversity. Therefore, 
in contemporary states the voice of the people cannot be appropriated 
by one group of citizens, even if it is a majority, but it arises from the 
procedures that guarantee a manifestation of this plurality (C-141/10; 
translation by the author). 
The normative basis for the constitutional paradigm is not the general will, 
or other collective entities such as nation and race, but a plurality of individuals 
that recognize each other as equal. 
The next most fundamental novelty of the 1991 Constitution concerns the 
inclusion of rights. The diversity of the constituent assembly as well as the 
dismal human rights situation in Colombia resulted in rights being taken much 
more seriously. After all, this was one of the central rallying calls of the student 
movement. To that end, the first 90 articles of the 1991 Constitution concern 
5  This is also the reason why the new Constitution has relatively flexible reform mechanisms and 
lacks anything resembling eternity clauses. 
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norms, principles and rights, which include first (private rights), second (social 
rights), and third (collective cultural rights) generational rights6. Particularly, 
the inclusion of cultural rights, paying debt to Colombia’s indigenous heritage, 
foreshadows developments in other South American States by more than ten 
years. Again, this can be traced to the plurality of the constituent assembly, 
which gave observer status to an indigenous guerrilla group: the Movimiento 
Armado Quintín Lame. As my interviewees confirmed, the new Constitution 
contributed a great deal towards making those previously marginalized groups 
visible to the Colombian public, giving them a voice of their own.
 The centrality of rights and pluralism in the identity of the new Constitution 
also affects Old Law’s most central principle: the principle of legality. The 
constitutionalism of Nuevo Derecho does not delegate it to futility. For example, 
Article 230 holds that judges are exclusively accountable to the empire of law, 
upholding the importance and centrality of the written text of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, it nuances the strictness in its jurisprudence by also weighing 
the proportionality, rationality, and efficacy of reforms and laws. Efficacy 
implies that everything must be interpreted and cannot leave out jurisprudential 
questions for the sake of rationality. Thus, rationality only comes into play 
as long as it does not violate the efficacy of the rights review7. The most 
important neo-constitutionalist principle, without a doubt, is the principle of 
proportionality. It is central for modern constitutionalism, which has to cope 
with the proliferation of rights, on the one hand, and an increasing number of 
functions taken over by the State, on the other hand. As such, rights and valid 
State interest often juxtapose one another in constitutional questions (Kumm, 
2010 & 2007). When judges test the proportionality of a law or legal mechanism, 
they ask if the infringement is proportional to the interest that competes with it8. 
Pluralism, rights, and new principles of interpretation transformed the 
Constitution from a “written Constitution to a living Constitution”9. This means 
that the new Constitution values rights not as functioning outside of the legal 
context, but identifies them in the circumstances of human existence. Living 
constitutions, of course, take precedence much more serious than static written 
6  Interview subject no. 38 (Supreme Court judge), April 17, 2013.
7  Interview subject no. 8 (Constitutional Court judge), May 17, 2013.
8  Interview subject no. 8 (Constitutional Court judge), May 17, 2013
9  Interview subject no. 10 (Constitutional Court judge), March 8, 2013.
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constitutions. In addition, the new constitutionalism in Colombia also holds 
that derecho substantial (substantial law) has precedence over derecho formal 
(formal law). In sum, it deviates decisively from the textualism of the old 
constitutionalism. One interviewee puts it nicely: 
The interpretation of law has to be an interpretation that is teleological 
and takes into account the value of justice, equality, and the value of 
due process. In the Constitution, the norm acts in an integral manner. It 
is much more intended as a way to resolve problems10.
The new Constitution changes the role of the constitutional judge from a 
dogmatic interpreter of laws and norms to a pragmatic problem solver mediating 
between norms that exist on paper and actors that function in real life. This is 
arguably the farthest-reaching consequence of the 1991 Constitution, because 
it fits into a generic shift towards neo-constitutionalism, apparent in other 
places at the same time (for example South Africa). If constitutionalism entails 
the control of the exercise of political power, neo-constitutionalism generally 
entails the fact that political power is additionally constrained by rights based 
constitutional adjudication. 
The prior discussions on the legacy trajectories of the National Front 
and the reforms at the beginning of the 19th century showed that the new 
institutional framework had immediate effects. Most notably, violence subsided 
almost entirely, but crony relations also stabilized within the formal two-party 
system. The aftermath of the 1991 Constitution is more complex and displays 
contradictory developments resultant from the institutional juncture and the 
effects of the then still burgeoning drug economy. Violence did not subsided 
immediately, but as it was being fuelled by the drug economy, continued 
unabated. It created new violent actors (the paramilitaries of the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia; United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, herafter AUC) 
and strengthened existing ones (FARC). Arguably, the State’s capacities further 
contracted, which in turn developed into a more open and inclusive Colombian 
democracy that was nonethelessbesieged by violent, non-democratic forces in the 
periphery of the country. These violent forces would eventually grasp important 
foothold into the national political institutions (Bejarano & Pizarro, 2005). 
10  Interview subject no. 10 (Constitutional Court judge), March 8, 2013. See also Cifuentes, 1995. 
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Patronage systems, which prior to the 1991 Constitution functioned from 
within the traditional two party system, now slowly morphed into informal 
relations that function from outside of that system. This created a new, even more 
vicious and cynical form of cronysm characterized by its armed nature, which 
built on the internal fragmentation and eventual collapse of the traditional party 
system. Central to this process is the national circumscription of the Senate vote, 
as it was decided in the constituent assembly. It threatened elites’ regionally 
clustered power base by potentially opening the doors for policy alternatives 
in those regions. As a response traditional elites tried to prevent the actual 
implementation of such a change in the way regional politics had functioned 
traditionally in Colombia 11. Paramilitaries for their part, pursued a strategy of 
counter-agrarian reform, and systematically displaced large populations out of 
frontier lands. They robbed the peasants’ lands, and repopulated it with their own 
cronies and allies. For them, a central goal of the political paramilitary project 
was the legalization of agrarian counter-reform (López, Hernández, 2010). 
This situation set incentives for both sides to collaborate. Politicians wanted 
to be shielded from the electoral changes of the 1991 Constitution, while the 
illegal armed groupsaimed at whitewashing their project as a political one 
(Rodríguez-Raga, 2002, p.222-225). To be sure, narco-paramilitarism in that 
era became counter-insurgency not because of ideological convictions, but 
because this was “the basic point of agreement with the elites and State agents 
that supported their expansion” (Ávila Martínez, 2010, p.117). Thus, AUC 
commanders undertook “violent campaigns” on behalf of candidates that then 
shielded their interests in Congress, resulting in the effective co-optation of 
the legislature. As a result of these evolutions the decisions taken in the 1991 
juncture had a long lasting, albeit contradictory legacy.
Figure 2 below helps us to summarize the analysis. The reforms associated 
with General Reyes and the National Front agreement essentially evolved 
along the lower ideal-type trajectory (colored in black arrows), while the 1991 
followed the top ideal-type trajectory (colored in red arrows).
In the crises leading up to the Reyes Reforms and the National Front 
agreement, elite intransigence resulted in unmanageable situations of interest 
11  This is essentially a prolongation of regional elites’ approach to the electoral threat posed 
by the UP. As it has being seen drug merchants, proto-paramilitaries and sectors of the security 
apparatus initiated an assassination campaign against activists of the UP, essentially eliminating its 
entire leadership, because it started to chip away at traditional politicians’ electoral strongholds. 
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and identity conflicts. The resulting partisan clashes forced the same elites to 
hammer out new deals in tightly managed processes of institutional reform. 
They established new consociational arrangements that served to calm political 
conflict and stabilize crony relations by placing them on a more stable formal 
institutional setting. The political system remained oligarchic, and contained in 
it the seed for future upheaval. In the crisis leading up to the 1991 Constitution, 
the international drug trade, which carry along with it an external shock against 
colombian feeble political stability, unleashed centrifugal forces impossible to 
contain within the existing institutional arrangement. Moreover, it created a 
normative cleavage between the normative claim of a democracy (to implement 
rule by the people) and the political reality of a system besieged by violence and 
unable to maintain channels for political participation. It culminated in a moment 
that both transformed the foundations of political interaction, and perhaps 
more importantly could neither be predicted nor explained on the basis of prior 
conditions, but resulted from collective and communicative action. The students’ 
movement first coalesced around a small group in Bogotá’s universities and 
Figure 3
The 1991 critical juncture
Source: compiled by the author.
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then expanded into a very diverse and national coalition of various students’ 
bodies which began a rearrangement of the Colombian political environment 
from outside of the country’s formal institutions. The juncture itself, namely 
the constituent assembly, involved citizens in the drafting stage, included 
previously marginalized groups (former leftist guerrillas and indigenous people) 
in the debating stage, and was publicly deliberated and decided. In short, the 
Conservative-Liberal hegemony of formal public, civic and political affairs 
was broken. It produced a neo-constitutionalist charter. 
Conclusion
What does the understanding of the constituent process in Colombia in 1991 
as a communicative process tells us about institutions and their origin? We 
began with the notion that they are defined as devices designed and used to 
arrest change. It is this caveat that has opened up the space for critiques of 
our understanding of institutions, which is squarely rooted in the three neo-
institutionalist schools. As Mahoney and Thelen lament, “despite many other 
differences, nearly all definitions of institutions treat them as relatively enduring 
features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure 
behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously” (2010, p.4). As 
they point out, this bias towards continuity at the expense of smaller shifts is 
present in all three of the classical expressions of neo-institutionalism: historical, 
sociological, and rational choice institutionalism (p.6). The contributions of 
those strands of political analysis are not in doubt, yet the literature has started 
to focus on the more gradual forms of change and, above all, is looking for 
the role that should be accorded to human agency into the analysis of political 
processes. This is the most fundamental contention against approaches that 
focus on continuity and lock-in structures. 
Discursive institutionalism makes the bold claim that it is a more adequate 
way to understand agency and gradual change, which it does by focusing on 
the versatility of discourse and how ideas are transported. It theorizes about 
how human agents – rather than actors – generate, interpret, deliberate, apply 
ideas and thereby create meaning. Vivien Schmidt has long criticized that 
neo-institutionalists do not fully appreciate the centrality of ideas, even though 
politicians’ main task in democracies is to communicate ideas, and thereby 
legitimate their actions. She explains that the traditional institutionalist schools 
still have very little to say about how “ideas go from thought to word, to deed, 
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that is, how ideas are conveyed, adopted, and adapted” (2010, p.309). She 
proposes a shift to a deliberation-focused institutionalism that centers on the 
volatile relationship between word and deed, which has puzzled philosophers 
for centuries (Schmidt, p.304).
The foundational condition for discursively engaging actors is the presence 
of some form of public. Actors engage in discursive practice if there is an 
audience that listens and expects justification for action. Schmidt is right when 
she insinuates that this is the case for public policies in all democracies (Schmidt, 
2010, p.305). It is important to notice that this is also true for strategic actors, 
because even strategic actors with fixed preferences, who engage in rhetorical 
action, must convince and persuade an audience with argumentative rationality 
(Risse, 2002; Habermas, 1996). As a consequence, this argumentative logic 
of appropriateness also has validity for the discursive interaction in political 
settings. The applicability of discourse for the analysis of human interaction 
falls apart, however, when discourse and publicness is existentially threatened 
or non-existent.
Even under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions of a worsening 
civil war, the people managed to come together for free and open debates, 
installing a process that produced a formidably progressive document. The 
students’ movement owed most of its occurrence to the spontaneity of human 
action, which arise when a collective comes together in a common cause; in this 
case it was the collective grief over the assassination of a promising political 
leader. Moreover, throughout the debate, ethical and collective reasoning for 
the search of a common institutional framework – and not aligned interest or 
structure – tied the assembly of actors together. 
The question of constitution-making has become a very prominent topic of 
comparative politics; and it isparticularly true in the Latin American context. 
Ginsburg writes that “Latin America is something of a constitutional graveyard, 
in which formal texts have been replaced frequently over the past two centuries” 
(2014). As a consequence, an increasing number of scholars pay attention to 
various facets around the issues of constitution-making and the longevity of 
constitutions. Negretto most recently produced an outstanding contribution to 
the study of those constitutional moments that structure politics anew (2014). 
He understands the volatility and frequency of constitutions in Latin America 
as a chance to properly understand the politics of writing a political charter, 
and the forces at play at these junctures that until now remained behind the veil 
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of contingency. In his carefully designed study, he shows that similar factors 
such as actors’ resources and expectations about future political development 
affect the selection of institutional set-ups in such areas as electoral system 
and presidential powers. Intriguingly, what topics are selected for debates in 
constituent processes and how judicial institutions are constructed were outside 
the scope of Negretto’s enlightening study. 
This paper made a first effort of getting at these questions by posing that 
the initial crisis provided a discursive context that placed the 1980s Colombian 
human rights situation at the center of public debate. It suggests that it was 
not a coincidence that rights and judicial institutions became a central focus 
of the constituent process, given the normative crisis that preceded the critical 
juncture. Yet, Negretto is correct to call for more research and a broader scope 
to study topic selection in constituent bodies. The task is then to increase causal 
leverage by constructing comparative studies with a broader scope, across cases, 
to understand under what conditions rights become the central grievance of 
constitution-making. A positivistic study could take the result of implementing 
a Kelsenian high court model as an indication that the unification of rights under 
one jurisdiction was a primary concern of constituents, and then work back to 
identify conditions at the beginning of such processes. Such a categorization 
can be quickly filled with data and provide a large set of observations that 
is amenable to broader investigations. Moreover, to identify actors and their 
arguments in a constituent process, rights can be disaggregated by their type. 
As it has been seen the 1991 Constitution not only included private and civic 
rights, but also social and collective (cultural) rights. This, too, is amenable 
to cross-case quantification. Above all, however, this paper argued that the 
discursive context and the activism of agents must be closely inspected and 
incorporated into the analysis. Therefore, future research must make an effort 
to combine classical approaches (quantitative or qualitative) to identify actors, 
their resources and the implementation of constitutional negotiations with 
discursive analyses, because constitutions reflect a societal consensus over 
the commonly shared values and identities that give future political interaction 
meaning and significance. These values and identities are most often consecrated 
in the expression of rights.
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Appendix: interview data
In total, I conducted over 40 in-depth elite interviews with persons directly 
or indirectly involved with the Constitutional Court of Colombia as well as 
individuals who occupy prominent positions in the analysis of the actions by 
the Constitutional Court, such as professors of law of the most important law 
schools in the country or persons engaged with NGOs that are involved in 
actively litigating Constitutional Court cases. The interviewees consisted of 
all magistrates of Colombia’s Constitutional Court, who were on the Court in 
2010 when the decision regarding a law to call for referendum to allow a second 
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re-election was decided save for one, whose auxiliary judge I interviewed. I 
also interviewed four of the nine members of the Constitutional Court that 
decided the decision regarding the law to permit constitutional change for a 
first re-election of the President of the Republic. Furthermore, the interviews 
consisted of auxiliary judges of eight different magistrates of the Court from 
different periods. The interviewees list also included three magistrates from 
the Supreme Court of the Republic. Finally, I interviewed three journalists, 
four Senators and Representatives from the Chamber of Representatives, ten 
professors of law and political science with specialization in legal politics and 
judicial/political culture, and five activists from NGOs litigating Constitutional 
Court cases. The selection resulted from an analysis of the sentences by the 
Constitutional Court, a survey of the literature on judicial politics in Colombia, 
as well as an archival research of the most important journalistic publications 
in Colombia (Semana, El Tiempo, El Espectador, Cambio). In the analysis, the 
structuring of the interview contents according to topics was complemented 
by an ordering of first, second, and third order observation of the position of 
the interviewees. Thus, magistrates belong into the first category, auxiliary 
judges into the second, and observer and interpreters of jurisprudence of the 
Court into the third category. The interviews were in-depth and focused on the 
issues resulting from the content analysis of publications. They lasted from 
one hour to two and a half hours. The questions were structured according to 
these four topics: 
1. Democracy and constitutionality:
• Sovereignty of the people and constitutional reform
• The role of the judiciary in the Colombian Constitution
• What is the legal culture (Cultura Legalista) in Colombia and how has it c
• hanged since the new constitution in 1991?
 
2. Judiciary and the media: 
• The press and publicity as democratic phenomena.
• The impact of media discourse on decisions by the Court.
• How does the Court communicate with the media? Is it legitimate?
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3. Deliberation and institutionalism
• The role of deliberation amongst magistrates before and during the 
process 
• of reaching a decision.
• Can you describe the deliberations regarding re-election?
4. Uribe, democratic security and re-election
• What was the importance of democratic security and did it justify re-
election?
• What were the important changes between the first and second decision 
• regarding constitutional reform and re-election?
• How did the political scandals affect the decision?
• What importance did the revelations regarding the so-called Yidispolítica 
• scandal have?
• How important were the official investigations by the Supreme Court in 
• the parapolítica scandal?
• Did the image of an institutional crisis resulting from a negative decision 
• regarding re-election matter in deliberations?
